Threat Model and Security Analysis
This document outlines the threat model for Dogenals protocols, including attack vectors, mitigations, and assumptions.
Assumptions
- Dogecoin blockchain is secure and immutable.
- Indexers are honest; malicious indexers can censor but not forge.
- Users control their private keys.
- Off-chain metadata is not trusted.
Attack Vectors
1. Signature Forgery
- Description: Fake signatures on collections or cancels.
- Mitigation: ECDSA verification with canonical JSON.
- Residual Risk: Weak randomness in key generation.
2. Double-Spend / Replay
- Description: Reuse intents across txs.
- Mitigation: Canonical ordering, txid binding.
- Residual Risk: Reorgs can invalidate recent txs.
3. Provenance Gaps
- Description: Ownership changes without intents.
- Mitigation: Gap detection flags suspicious transfers.
- Residual Risk: False positives on complex txs.
4. Spam / DoS
- Description: Flood chain with low-value inscriptions.
- Mitigation: Economic fees, size limits.
- Residual Risk: High fees may exclude users.
5. Front-Running
- Description: Snatch listings with faster bids.
- Mitigation: Block ordering is fair.
- Residual Risk: MEV in mempool.
6. Regulatory Attacks
- Description: Use for illicit activities.
- Mitigation: Protocols are neutral; marketplaces enforce.
- Residual Risk: Legal risks for implementers.
Security Invariants
- No trust in JSON alone; verify on-chain.
- Signatures recomputed, not trusted from payload.
- Balances checked before transfers.
- First-deploy-wins prevents squatting.
Recommendations
- Use hardware wallets for high-value ops.
- Monitor for unusual activity.
- Contribute to open audits.
This model ensures Dogenals remains secure and decentralized.